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The Selective Conscience
Liane Norman*
The world needs to establish and apply certain criteria in considering inhuman actions by great powers. These should not be
the criteria convenient to the victor, as at Nuremberg, but those
which enable private citizens to make compelling judgments on
the injustices committed by any great power.
... ifthe law does not respect fundamental human rights, or does
not apply to the government itself, then we cannot say even that
2
a habit of obedience makes pro tanto for a better society.

The odd-and possibly most instructive-thing about the Vietnam
war is that while all the physical ruination has taken place in Southeast Asia, there has developed a sense of moral ruination in the United
States. It is the sense of possibility unrealized, of high promise gone
sour. The Vietnam war has upheaved fundamental questions about
0 B.A., Grinnell College; MA., Ph.D., Brandeis University; Lecturer, English Dept.,
University of Pittsburgh.
1.

B. RUSSELL, AGAINST THE CRIMES OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THlE RUSSELL INTER-

4 (1968).
Dworkin, What is the Rule of Law?, 30 ANTIOCH REV. 151 (1970).
An editorial in the New Yorker puts it:
...
untroubled by any acts of hostility from a foe, we are troubled by our own acts,
which come back to haunt us . . .so although our physical world remains intact, we
are secretly being destroyed .... Somehow, the country has been more battered by
this war than by any other war in the century, including the world wars. The war
has now rooted itself in the lives of Americans as firmly as some venerable institutions. It has become part of the heritage of all of us. Instead of our controlling it and
ending it, it has adapted us to its needs and bent us to its purposes. It has shouldered aside the needs of our people in order to nourish itself, and has warped our
Constitutional system in order to make room for itself.
NEW YORKER, Dec. 30, 1972, at 21. Daniel Ellsberg believes that the bombing of North
Vietnam is "a final solution," or extermination of a people who cannot otherwise be
defeated: he implies, of course, a high degree of analogy among people who can set out
NATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

2.
3.

to achieve final solutions. D. ELLSBERG, PAPERS ON THE WAR 255 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

ELLSBERG]. Henry Steele Commager grieves angrily that America is "a people infatuated
with their own virtue, their superiority to other peoples, and their exemption from the
ordinary laws of nations and the familiar standards of ethics .... ." Commager, The
Defeat of America, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 12. Frances Fitzgerald sees the
situation as one in which ". . . U.S. officials had enmired Vietnam. They had corrupted
the Vietnamese and, by extension, the American soldiers who had to fight amongst the
Vietnamese in their service. By involving the United States in a fruitless and immoral
war, they had also corrupted themselves." F. FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE 424 (1972).

Anthony Lewis, in a series of New York Times essays, says that Vietnam "is the issue on
which the United States will be judged, by the world and by itself." Lewis, The Imperfect
Circle, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1972, at 33, col. 5. The war has demonstrated that: "The United
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the obligation of the individual to obey his government, as against
his obligation to obey his conscience. For the dead, maimed, homeless, displaced, and corrupted 4 Indochinese, American introspection,
of little comfort in any case, will come too late. Certainly the
destruction of one society cannot be justified as a means of educating
another: nonetheless, one of the few reassuring dimensions of this
traumatic war is that it has penetrated to the very heart of some of our
most cherished assumptions. Many citizens, for instance, are wondering anew what their relations as individuals ought to be with their
government, and to what degree it is their duty to be obedient to that
government. It is significant that the anguish felt by many Americans
is not about war in general. Rather, it is this war .that has stimulated
bitter disenchantment. It is this war that has made selective conscientious objection an issue.
Selective conscientious objection is a challenge, by an individual,
to the government. The individual questions the justice of a war that
his government is waging, and thus questions the government's right
to require him to obey its conscription orders. Selective conscientious
objection is not pacifism. It is a position that holds that there are instances in which war is justified and in which the government has the
right to require his obedience. This position rests on the assumption,
however, that government cannot be relied on to determine accurately
the justice of its own wars, and that the individual has a right, if not
a positive responsibility, to assess his government's policy, to determine
its justice in the light of his own conscience, and to refuse obedience
to the government in furtherance of what he deems an unjust war
policy. The selective conscientious objector believes that insofar as his
own efforts are concerned in matters of war, he is a policy-maker of
comparable legitimacy to the government.
The Supreme Court has held that conscientious objection to all war
States is the most dangerous and destructive power in the world." Lewis, Slaughterhouse
Six, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1972, at 43, col. 1. It is an issue, says Lewis, which "has proved
that there are no effective political mechanisms in the American system to restrain the
President between elections." Lewis, The War President, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1972, at 43,
col. 1. Some aspects of the waging of which, notably the use of defoliants, herbicides,
napalm, gas, the mining of harbors and rivers, the bombing of settled areas, have shown
a "contempt for the concept of law. [The President] ... did not even attempt to justify in
international legal terms what stood unless justified in some way, as an act of outlawry."
Lewis, Hope Against Hope, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1972, at 31, col. 1. Whether such statements
are true or not is less important here than the moral anguish which makes such perceptions
possible.
4. For a very interesting account of the war as a source of Vietnamese corruption see
F. FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE (1972).
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is protected by the first amendment's guarantee of religious free exercise. But neither the Congress nor the Court has recognized as a first
amendment right the refusal to serve, on conscientious grounds, in a
particular war. In Gillette v. United States5 the Supreme Court took
the position that limiting conscientious objection to all war does not
constitute religious discrimination nor work to establish any religion.
This, I think, is not the case, and I will argue below that the Gillette
decision works to disestablish an emphatically, though not exclusively,
modern ethical position. But it should be noted here that all branches
of government have been much concerned not to permit effective challenges by individual citizens of government policy, and not to confront
the real possibility that the government of the United States is capable
of waging an unjust war.6
Amnesty is the other side of the selective-conscientious-objection
coin. Many of those asking for amnesty are the same people who were
refused selective conscientious objector status and, having spent time
in jail, having left the country, or having deserted from the military,
wish to be readmitted into full citizenship.7 Amnesty for draft resisters,
evaders, or deserters is bitterly contested because it would seem to condone the judgment that some citizens have made that this war requires
their refusal rather than their obedience. Further, amnesty, if granted,
might seem to recognize such refusal as a right. Opposition to amnesty
seems to be based on the sense that if those who have disputed the
justice of this war, to the extent of going to jail, leaving the country,
or deserting, are severely punished, then the questions that they have
5. 401 U.S. 437 (1970).
6. The Pentagon Papers decision, United States v. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713
(1971), might seem to contradict this assertion. Of the majority who found for the Times
and against the government's desire to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers, only
Justices Black and Douglas took note of the press as an instrument whose role in a democracy is to "bare the secrets of government and inform the people." Id. at 718. This opinion
implies that government may be wrong and that it is the people's right to know it and to
oppose it. The generality of opinion of the Court, however, was far more limited as to the
freedoms of the press and the public to censure government. On the whole, the Court's
reasoning is not encouraging.
7. It should be noted that many young men claimed conscientious objector status,
although their beliefs more properly were those of selective conscientious objection. They
claimed conscientious objector status to be relieved from what they regarded as immoral
activities in Vietnam, and to do this, they had, to some degree, to misrepresent themselves.
Critics of their position discount the depth of their moral conviction on the grounds
that their "sincerety" is diminished by their willingness to claim beliefs that they did not
strictly hold. But from the selective objector's point of view, the greater immorality would
be killing in Vietnam in behalf of a cause they deeply believed to be unjust: the lesser
immorality was misrepresentation of their own views. Similarly, many deserters are selective objectors who were not permitted to apply for or receive conscientious objector
status from within the military. Needless to say, the military is not particularly receptive
to a soldier's claims to exemption from military service on moral grounds.
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promulgated can be ignored. If, on the other hand, conscientious
scruples to a particular war are recognized as even conceivably legitimate, then painful uncertainties about the right relations between the
government and the individual are crystallized.
To oppose selective conscientious objection and amnesty has the
effect of declaring that the government's policies are right. People have
a desperate need to believe in their government and in the assumptions
according to which it governs.
The trust of people is in the law and in justice. Such faith cannot
long continue if the petty criminal alone is punished and the major
malefactor escapes.8
This statement suggests that public faith is tied to a workable and just
definition of malefaction. In this case, the appetite to deny relief to
selective objectors and to deny amnesty to those requesting it, is a way
-albeit backhanded-of affirming that objectors are the major malefactors and that whatever faults the government has committed are,
by comparison, petty. This is, it appears, preferable to having to
manage the thought that the government may be wrong and that
the resisters are wrong only insofar as they refuse to obey laws that
would make them accomplices. The law at present holds that the
selective objector, who acts on his convictions, is the malefactor, but
both the selective objector and the man in need of amnesty assert that
the government is the wrongdoer in perpetrating an unjust war. It is
easy to understand that the present law supports a conclusion that is
more comfortable, both to government and a large part of the citizenry,
than a ruling that entertained the opposite conclusion would be.
The courts have been reluctant to rule on the legality of this war.
While the notion of inherent presidential warmaking power has been
challenged (not very effectively, considering the expanded and intensified bombing of December 1972, as well as the invasions of Laos and
Cambodia, and the mining of harbors and rivers), the lower courts
have accepted the rationale that the Congress has granted implicit authorization for the war by means of appropriations bills as well as by
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.9 The "political question" doctrine, according to which the executive and legislative branches must determine
the justice of their own policies, has been invoked by the courts in refusing to determine if the Vietnam war is in violation of the constitu8. J. A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL
9. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.

CRIMES 10

(1954).
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tion.' 0 But it is not as clear as it might be that Congress has been

consulted and has, in effect, declared war: it may well be that the executive has exceeded its constitutional authority. Whether or not this is
the case, however, the justice of a war may be arguable even if it is
authorized by Congress, although more widely shared war-making
powers would have the effect of subjecting the making of war to more
various and systematic scrutiny."
The Pentagon Papers decision 12 notwithstanding, the courts have not
seriously examined the complex questions concerning the government's
right to require obedience in wartime and the individual's right to
refuse obedience on grounds that his government is pursuing an ethically untenable policy. The most important aspect of the Pentagon
Papers case is the re-affirmation that the press has the right-indeed,
the obligation-to expose governmental chicanery, and that citizens
must know what their government is up to if they are to make their
own choices wisely. Implicit in this decision is the likelihood that wellinformed citizens may find that the government's actions are unworthy
of support or even that they require opposition. In the case of the Vietnam war, the executive branch, through several administrations, has
been at pains to protect itself, the Congress, and the public from knowledge of its acts.' 3 This in itself is not reassuring of the war's justice.
The executive branch has assumed that it has the exclusive expertise
and right to make policy and that the justice of what it does is either
irrelevant or beyond challenge. The conscripted citizen, in such a view,
cannot possibly and has no right to make judgments about his government's war policies.
II
In Gillette the Supreme Court found that individuals are not permitted to determine the justice of their government's war policies in10. See McArther v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968); Mora v. M'Namara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
11. Cf. note 43 infra (Richard Falk's checklist of a war's just attributes). The first item
implies confidence in congressional declarations of war. Strangely, the emphasis by the
executive branch has been on not getting an explicit declaration of war, but rather, on
proving that it has the functional equivalent. This emphasis suggests that the executive
branch either 1) believes that Congress might make waging war more difficult, or 2) that
the reasons for going to war would not stand up well to scrutiny.
12. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
13. A number of sources make this clear. D. HALBERSTAM, Ti BEUT AND Tm BRsrrEsr (1972) is a piece of elaborate and high-level gossip, which reveals how men and institutions systematically, almost pathologically, refused to know or to communicate the
truth about the Vietnam war. See ELLSBERG, supra note 3.
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sofar as to refuse obedience to conscription. The Court held that the
relevant section of the Selective Service Act 14 cannot be interpreted to
sanction selective conscientious objection and that this interpretation
does not work to establish any religion.
The facts of the Gillette ruling, briefly, are as follows: Gillette was
convicted for failure to report for induction. He argued that although
he would fight to repel an attack on the United States15 or in a U.N.
sponsored "peace-keeping" effort, he could not, in conscience, be a
member of the armed services as long as it was engaged in the Vietnam war, which he deeply believed to be unjust. His obligation not to
participate was
... "based on a humanist approach to religion" and his personal
decision concerning military service was guided by fundamental
principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose
and obligation of human existence.' 6
Negre, the co-petitioner in the case, had already been inducted, completed basic training, and received orders for duty in Vietnam before
he instituted his claim to conscientious objector status, on the grounds
that the Vietnam war was injust. He believed that, according to Catholic doctrine, his duty was to discriminate between just and unjust wars
and to refuse to serve in the latter.' He had come to consider the Vietnam war unjust during his infantry training, and believed that to participate in the war would be in violation of his conscience and his
religious upbringing.
Petitioners claimed that the Selective Service Act, if interpreted to
prohibit conscientious objection in the case of particular wars, was a
violation of their first amendment free exercise of religion right. In
each case, the petitioner claimed that his religious and ethical beliefs
enjoined upon him the duty to discriminate between just and unjust
wars and to refuse military service in what he determined to be an
unjust conflict. There was no question about the sincerity or religious
14.
15.
feel to
16.
17.

50 U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970).
He opposed involvement in a war sought to advance what the government may
be "vital" interests.
401 U.S. at 440. The quoted phrase is from Gillette's petition.
In

1968, Pastoral Letter of American Bishops, HUMAN

LIFE, Nov.

15, 1968, at

41-44, reversed an earlier judgment that the Vietnam war was justified. This letter refers
to the Catholic "tradition which accepts enlightened conscience, even when honestly
mistaken, as the immediate arbiter of moral decisions .... ." Id. at 43. It recommends
that the present conscientious objection laws be revised to accommodate "those whose
reasons of conscience are more personal and specific ...." Id. at 44.
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character of either petitioner's belief,' 8 but only about the legitimacy
of their claims that the first amendment guaranteed them the right to
exercise choice in determining whether obedience was required to
war policies that they considered unjust. The Court reasoned that
disallowing selective conscientious objection is not "arbitrary and
capricious," as petitioners claimed, nor that it works "invidious discrimination" as among religious beliefs, in violation of the first amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, said that "the question, can a
conscientious objector, whether his objection be rooted in 'religion'
or in moral values, be required to kill? has never been answered by
the Court."'19 The majority opinion, however, found that the conscription law "simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war. '20
This is as much as an admission that insofar as a man's religious beliefs
concern war, the Gillette decision countenances religious discrimination. In order to find that the Selective Service Regulations do not
discriminate, the Court has to exempt war from those activities regulated by religious belief.
Mr. Justice Douglas appears to be right. By exempting war from
among religious considerations, the Court fails to deal with the
question, can someone who profoundly objects to doing so be forced
to kill? To construe the question at hand as being apart from beliefs
concerning war is to refuse to examine the claim made by petitioners.
The Court's exception of war from moral or religious standards is
expressive of a more general tendency to see the war in Vietnam as a
peculiarly technical, almost mechanical problem. This is not to suggest
that the arguments advanced by government officials in behalf of the
war are not moralistic; the arguments are, indeed, based in part on a
kind of demonism that has its roots in the Puritan dramaturgy of the
cosmos. But the war in Indochina has been waged on the basis of
"mechanistic theories of human motivation." 21 The government has
often acted with a sense of universal control, as though with "all the
18. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court held that: "If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and
content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from
participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that
individual 'a place parallel to that filled by .. . God' in traditionally religious persons."
Id. at 340 (emphasis added). This definition of religiousness applies, of course, only to
Gillette; Negre claimed exemption as a traditionally religious person.
19. 401 U.S. at 465.
20. 401 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
21. R. BARNET, ROOTS OF WAR 101 (1972).
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technological power [its] command, [officials] can play upon the world
22
like a giant console."
Another phase of the effort to remove war from ethical canons is in
the sophisticated conversion from human to electronic warfare: by
replacing battlefield soldiers with machinery, moral scruples are more
nearly eliminated from the conflict and "vital" interests can be pursued
pretty much unhindered by the reluctance of one man to kill another.
For the same reason, the language used by war planners to describe the
Vietnam war has been highly metaphorical-the language of sanitation, pest-control, and cowboy-and-Indian games. All of these tendencies
work to diminish considerations bearing on the justice of the war, by
destroying the traditional situation in which combatants face one
another and have to suspend their normal ethical codes in order to kill
one another.
Gillette's and Negre's cases depend on the reach of their religious
codes. Each claims that his religious belief affects not only lesser matters,
but matters of the magnitude of war. Each believes that he can be
required to kill only when he is convinced of the overwhelming necessity. Their case is that conscientious action with regard to war is essential
to their religious beliefs.
Negre's claim is based on venerable Catholic tradition (which Mr.
Justice Douglas refers to rather extensively in his dissent). Catholic
doctrine recognizes that sometimes civil authority will make commands
that are contrary to God's will, and that when this contrariety is
discerned by the individual conscience, a man's duty is to obey God,
even if it means disobeying civil authority. For Catholics, the "just
war doctrine" insists that war and one's actions therein are religious
matters, and that war is not separable from religion. Gillette's case
presents a more singular problem to the Court, because his religious
conviction that he must refuse obedience is not sanctioned by membership in long-established religious tradition, and shows more kinship to political dissent.
Nonetheless, Gillette's position is not by any means ad hoc or
eccentric: it is a significant religious point of view that has evolved
in our time.23 Gillette's ethical humanism, which to him is a mandate
22. Id. at 131.
23. Respect for an individual's religious beliefs, of course, does not depend on their
being part of a dominant religious movement, however hard to define. In Welsh, the Court,
despairing of an adequate definition of religion, established a criterion that is highly
individual and adaptable.
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not to serve in furtherance of the Vietnam war, is distinctly modern in
its lack of institutional formality, theology, or demonology. It is consistent with the widespread twentieth-century existentialist strain of
philosophy, fundamental to which is belief in the paramount importance of an individual's making deliberate choices appropriate to
particular, highly specific circumstances. Indeed, the issue of selective
conscientious objection is not likely to be considered a settled one,
Gillette notwithstanding, precisely because conscientious selectivity in
matters of war is so thoroughly in tune with existential ideas about
the nature of moral accountability. Both selective conscientious objection and existentialism derive from a distrust of any sweeping doctrine, on the grounds that generalities do not adequately apply to the
complexity and the specificity of an individual's confrontation with
circumstances, which alone constitute the basis of choice.
Gillette has difficulty, as does traditionally religious Negre, excluding
war from his religious-ethical belief because, like all other human
activities, a war presents itself to him as a distinctive case made up
of particulars. He can imagine instances in which he could conscientiously go to war; but war, as well as other situations, requires
that he make a choice based on its particularity. This choice involves
knowing a good deal about the history and circumstances of the war:
on the basis of his knowledge, his ethical charge is to decide what
behavior is moral under the circumstances. 24 People who share Gillette's
view cannot conceive of religious belief apart from beliefs concerning
war.
The illogic of the Court's reasoning, that apart from beliefs concerning war the Selective Service Act violates no first amendment
religious freedom, is made apparent by noting that absolute conscientious objectors, whose religious beliefs certainly do not exclude
war, are protected in their refusal to go to war. Both Congress and the
Court have recognized that religious belief and practice may well
concern war, but both Congress and the Court have insisted that
discrimination among wars cannot be recognized as an allowable
24. I do not, of course, know what went on in Gillette's mind as he regarded his decision; the "he" of these sentences is an imaginary selective conscientious objector. One
encounters considerable skepticism about the reliability of conscience: is not an ethic
based on conscience likely to reflect expediency decked out in fine sentiments? The answer,
in my view, is that conscience rarely acts in a vacuum. Selective objectors have very
often consulted not only their intuitive sense of injustice, in the case of the Vietnam war,
but the laws of the country and tenets of international law, and find the war in violation
of both.
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phase of religion. The critical difference is that absolute conscientious
objection offers no challenge to specific governmental policies. No
matter why or how a war is fought, the conscientious objector eschews
it as part of a flat refusal to countenance violence. The selective conscientious objector, on the other hand, is obligated to scrutinize and
assess the morality of particular governmental policies and to refuse
to aid the government should it engage in an unjust war.
It appears not so much that war is separable from religious and
ethical concerns, then, as that government will tolerate non-cooperation
only insofar as it does not call government policies into question; but
it will not tolerate religiously motivated non-cooperation that depends
on the belief that specific governmental policies are susceptible to
ethical judgment by individual citizens. The government clearly
understands that the selective conscientious objector charges it with
illegitimate policies, and rather than examine the policies, it requires
that those who question their legitimacy either obey or be punished.
If both modern existential humanism and traditional Catholicism
have an affinity for the position of the selective conscientious objector,
it should be noted that the man who selectively objects is also reinforced
by international standards of accountability. The Nuremberg principles established that obedience to unjust or unlawful orders is not
required. In fact, the individual soldier may be required to disobey
unlawful orders. The soldier is expected, under battlefield conditions,
to discriminate between acts that are lawful and those that are not.
Furthermore, he can be prosecuted as a war criminal if he fails to
discriminate between permissible and impermissible acts. 25 The most
significant principle to come from the Nuremberg trials is that:
...the

laws of war, and some other rules of international law, are
superior to domestic
law, and . . . individuals may be held ac26
countable to them.
It has been said that the Nuremberg principles requiring disobedience
to unlawful orders cannot be extended to authorize the individual's
refusal to participate in a war he believes to be unjust.27 The petitioners regard the Vietnam war as essentially criminal. Consequently, to
engage in the war itself is to be involved in what are by definition war
crimes. The superior orders, in this instance, come not from a com25.
26.
27.

T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAm
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 83.

42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as

TAYLOR].
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pany commander but from the selective service system. Petitioners feel
that to obey these orders would result in estrangement from their own
consciences and from international law. The principles of Nuremberg
have been cited both to defend and to condemn the Vietnam war.
But either usage implies
.. a common denominator: that there are some universal standards
of human behavior that transcend the duty of obedience to national laws .... [This is] the notion of accountability before the bar
of international law .... 28
Gillette and Negre, while they claimed accountability transcending
national duty on different grounds, behaved in a way that is consistent
29
with the Nuremberg ethos, which is selective.
Mr. Justice Douglas quotes Chief Justice Hughes, who said in United
States v. Macintosh 30 :

But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the state has always been maintained ....

The essence of religion

is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation. 31
Note that the language used here is very much like that quoted above
with regard to international law. In each case, the individual's obligation is to disobey domestic law if obedience would violate a higher
obligation.
It must be remembered, too, that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals established that some-not all-wars could be considered
criminal acts. The fact that it is difficult to apply this principle does
not alter the principle itself. Nor does it alter the extended implication of the requirement to choose between obedience and disobedience
to unlawful orders on the battlefield. If some wars are criminal, then
the clear implication of international law is that individuals must
choose not to obey orders to wage those wars. The difficulty in applying the principle that war can be criminal is a jurisdictional one. Nations are unwilling to part with sovereignty as the ultimate authority
where their own interests are at stake, in addition to which there is
the problem of who is to call a warring nation to account, unless it is
defeated. International law and the individual selective conscientious
28.
29.
30.
31.
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283
401

at 16.
at 14.
U.S. 605 (1931).
U.S. at 469, citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
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objector, thus, are frustrated alike by the insistence of the state that
it be the supreme and sole arbiter of the rightness of its actions. But
the point to be made here is that international law and certain religious
points of view, in this case Catholic tradition and modern existentialism, both enjoin the individual to choose on highly specific and circumstantial grounds, to exercise moral discrimination even-perhaps especially-in matters concerning war.
III
The effect of the Court's ruling in Gillette is that the government's
decisions to pursue particular policies by means of war are not to be
subject to the scrutiny or evaluation of individual conscience.3 2 What
this means is that the state is free to declare the absolute moral rectitude
of what it does. From the state's point of view, the freedom to proclaim itself on the side of the angels, and to proceed accordingly, is
good politics; from the individual's point of view, the conflict of
values which always accompanies war is heightened by the refusal of
his conscience to authorize what is normally outlawed, by reference
to the overriding justice of the state's purposes.
It is often difficult to imagine simultaneously the perspectives of
state and citizen in discussing war. Abstract discussions tend to bypass
the compelling specificity with which human beings confront experience. But imaginative literature has the capacity to put before us the
undiminished and stubborn concreteness of individuals, both great
and small. Into the abstract legal and political debate about the individual's obedience to the state, therefore, it is useful to introduce an
imaginary situation (based on historical fact) in which the relation of
the state to the individual in time of war is presented with greater
immediacy than might otherwise be possible.
There is a debate in Shakespeare's play, Henry V, which takes place
on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt as Henry goes among the common soldiers disguised as one of them. Henry is portrayed as a good
king, on the whole, and a successful commander. He has invaded
France to gain the throne, to which, the play makes clear, he has only
a tenuous claim. It is evidence of Shakespeare's special genius that even
in a play generally complimentary to the King, the audience is forced.
32. Government secrecy and deception further impede scrutiny and evaluation of government policies.
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to note that the source of his authority and appeal is his warmongering,
and that there is reason to question his cause. The King incognito, at
the campfire with the footsoldiers, muses:
I think the king is but a man, as I am; the violet smells to him
as it doth to me; the element shows to him as it doth to me; all
his senses have but human conditions. His ceremonies laid by,
in his nakedness he appears but a man; and though his affections
are higher mounted that ours, yet, when they stoop, they stoop
with the like wing. Therefore, when he sees reason of fears, as
we do, his fears, out of doubt, be of the same relish as ours are.
Yet, in reason, no man should possess him with any appearance
of fear, lest he, by showing it, should dishearten his army.
Bates: He may show what outward courage he will; but I believe,
as cold a night as 'tis, he could wish himself in Thames up to
the neck; and so I would he were, and I by him, at all adventures,
so we were quit here.
King: By my troth, I will speak my conscience of the King: I
think he would not wish himself anywhere but where he is.
Bates: Then I would he were here alone. So should he be sure to
be ransomed, and a many poor men's lives saved.
King: I dare say you love him not so ill to wish him here alone,
howsoever you speak this to feel other men's minds. Methinks I
could not die anywhere so contented as in the King's company,
his cause being just and his quarrel honorable.
Williams: That's more than we know.
Bates: Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough
if we know we are the King's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our
obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.
Williams: But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a
heavy reckoning to make when all those legs and arms and heads,
chopped off in a battle, shall join together at the latter day and
cry all "We died at such a place" some swearing, some crying for
a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some
upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I
am afeard there are few die well that die in a battle; for how can
they charitably dispose of anything when blood is their argument?
Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black matter for
;the King that led them to it; who to disobey were against all
,proportion of subjection.
King: ... The King is not bound to answer the particular endings
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of his soldiers .... Every subject's duty is the King's, but every
subject's soul is his own.
(Act IV, scene 1)
This debate embodies two opposing points of view about the moral
immunity conferred by war. The King and Bates express the view of
a twelfth century compiler of canon law, Gratian, who said that, "The
soldier who kills a man in obedience to authority is not guilty of
murder. 81 3 Telford Taylor, in the twentieth century, puts the same
idea this way:
..war consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed

in time of peace-killing, wounding, kidnapping, destroying or carrying off other peoples' property. Such conduct is not regarded as
criminal if it takes place in the course of war, because
the state of
34
war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.
Williams, on the other hand, sounds very much like Francisco de
Vitoria, a sixteenth century Dominican friar, who said:
If a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he ought not
to serve in it, even on the command of his Prince. This is35 clear,
for no one can authorize the killing of an innocent person.
This point is a telling one: the justification of belligerency requires
that another people have so wronged one's own people that they lose
their status as innocent civilians. The selective conscientious objector,
like Williams, does not find the state's offer of legal immunity, in
return for his services as a killer, convincing. The acts he is required
to commit, if unsanctioned by the overall justice of the war, are irretrievably criminal.
The questions posed here by sixteenth century fictional soldiers are
the same ones we face in the twentieth century real world. Who is to
determine the war's justice? He who has an interest in waging it? (In
the play, King Henry goes to war to gain the throne of France.) And
if the war is not just, to what degree is the individual soldier required
to obey or to disobey? Williams believes that it is only the justice of
the war that confers moral immunity. Naturally the King, although he
asserts that the war isjust,3 6 agrees with Bates. The King, however,
33. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 19.

34. Id.
0
35. 401 U.S. at 471.
36. I do not believe the play makes this convincing, and that the doubts on this issue
are deliberate on Shakespeare's part.
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has admitted that he is "but a man," and so his assertion of the war's
justice can be no more than an assertion. Men are fallible. It is only
in wartime that human rulers can ask for unquestioning obedience,
but even in wartime their judgments are no more than human.
Except for Mr. Justice Douglas-who says, in his dissent, "I had
assumed that the welfare of the single human soul was the ultimate
test of the vitality of the First Amendment" 3 7 -the Court's point of
view is the Government's in Gillette. In weighing the competing claims
of the state for obedience and of the petitioners for relief from obedience, the Court uses language much like King Henry's: "Every subject's duty is the King's, but every subject's soul is his own." The
Court's words are: "The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests .... ,38
These incidental burdens are not really so incidental. As Williams
points out, they have to do with the state of a man's soul; for the
existentialist, whether he can live with himself; for the Catholic, what
will become of him after death. Psychologically, the burdens appear
to be heavier for those who cannot believe in the wars they must fight
than for the true believers or the indifferent. Studies of those who have
survived combat in Vietnam, for instance, suggest that uncertainty
about the war's justice alters the way the survivors see themselves and
the world. Because their doubt denies them moral immunity, they
.find themselves having to deny the reality of the world and the real
-consequences of their actions in order to accomodate the collapse of
spiritual authority and personal integrity. 39 Normally, the guilt and
anger soldiers experience during war is neutralized by their sense of
larger purpose, or "holy validity, ' 40 but the absence of this neutralizing factor may result in an "atrocity-producingsituation."41 One of the
incidental burdens, thus, may be that a soldier finds himself in a psychological-ethical bind; a bind in -which he is likely to be impelled to
commit atrocities, which he is supposed not to commit according to
international laws of war. He will have to live with any such atrocities
for the rest of his life as he cannot justify his actions by referring to
the justice of the cause for which he fought.
37. 401 U.S. at 469.
38. 401 U.S. at 462.
39. Lifton, Home from the War, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1972, 56, 69 [hereinafter cited as
LiFTON].

40.

Id. at 58; cI. G. GRAY, THE WARRIORS (1959).

41.

LIFTON, supra note 39, at 58.
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There are many people to whom the idea of individual conscience
is anathema, because it seems subjective and anarchic. The Court
worries that "objection [to a war] may fasten on any of an enormous
number of variables [because] the claim is ultimately subjective, depending on the claimant's view of the facts in relation to his judgment .... -42 The selective objector, however, believes that just as it is
possible to apply standards of justice in civil matters, the justice of a
war can be determined; furthermore, it can be determined by a
private citizen as well as-and maybe better than-the government. 43
The Court, like Congress, is not sure how the political and conscientious applications of such criteria as do exist are to be distinguished
from one another. The Bill of Rights protects both, but the Congress
has tried to effect the separation by specifying narrowly the religious
character of a conscientious decision, and the Court, while broadening
the definition of religion, has insisted that acts of conscience have a
different status than acts of political opposition. In the case of absolute
42. 401 U.S. at 457.
43. Richard Falk has devised the following set of criteria to determine the justice of a
war, based on "the accumulated wisdom of the just war doctrine developed over a
period of centuries .... "
1) Has the war been properly declared by a competent political authority?
2) Were diligent efforts made to secure a peaceful settlement of the dispute that gave
rise to war?
3) Has the war proceeded from the necessity to defend territorial integrity and
political independence against external attack?
4) Is the war being conducted in such a way as to respect the distinctions between
combatants and civilians and between military and nonmilitary targets, to respect the
inherent prohibitions on tactics (e.g. torture) and weapons (e.g. poisons) of war?
5) Have the means used been proportional to the value of the belligerent objective
and to the prospects for its attainment?
6) Is the war being waged for limited and beneficial objectives and with a good intention to restore peace, justice, and order at the earliest possible time?
7) If the war is being fought on behalf of, or in conjunction with, a foreign government, then is that government worthy and capable of governing its own society or
has it been deemed so by a competent organ of the international community?
8) Have all reasonable efforts been made to initiate negotiations that look toward a
settlement of the war, to obtain a cease-fire during pending negotiations, and to limit
belligerent objectives to the status quo ante?
9) Has due account been taken of international procedures for reaching a community judgment about contending positions in a war and for facilitating community
inter-position?
10) Has every reasonable effort been made to prevent the recurrence of war in relation to a particular conflict?
11) Are reasonable efforts being made to strengthen the system of world order with
respect to securing justice by nonviolent means and with respect to arrangement for
pacific settlement of disputes?
On Just Wars: The Cause of World War II, a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, 1970, at 19. There are some people who say, "But what if conscience is wrong?" Clearly, on the principle of human fallibility, the individual conscience
may be wrong. But two things ought to be kept in mind: the selective objector does not
conscientiously decide to kill, but not to kill; further, the individual who is wrong is
relatively powerless compared to the state, to implicate others in his acts.
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conscientious objection, this distinction is clearly possible. Regardless
of the particular conditions of belligerency, the objector cannot in
conscience participate. But the selective objector's claim rests on no
such absolute attitude. The very grounds that might well stimulate
political dissent or resistance must be the basis for the decision of
personal conscience that refuses participation, as the Court notes. The
Court's reasoning reflects a concern that the impact of including selective conscientious objection in the category of first amendment protections would be, ultimately, political.
Conscientious objection is, numerically, a deviant position, and since
its logic is general and absolute, its efforts are not political. But the
Vietnam war has been increasingly unpopular as more about it is
known. If selective conscientious objection were to be allowed by the
first amendment, it is no doubt true that its effect would be political;
it is even conceivable-though remotely-that if selective conscientious
objection were legitimized, the government would have had trouble
fielding an army in Vietnam.4 4 Because selective objection would have
political impact is not necessarily a compelling argument against it.
In fact, such impact might be one of the strongest arguments in its
favor. If enough individuals find the government's war indefensible,
then, by their refusal, they might inhibit the government from waging
such a war.
The separation of conscience and politics is no less unwieldy than
the separation of conscience and war.
[A]lmost any law which a significant number of people would be
tempted to disobey on moral grounds would be doubtful-if not
clearly invalid-on constitutional grounds as well. The constitution makes our conventional political morality relevant to the
question of validity; any statute that appears to compromise that
morality raises constitutional questions, and if the compromise
is serious, the constitutional doubts are also serious.45
Both Congress and the Court have repeatedly spoken of the value of
conscience, but the Gillette ruling does not pay enough heed to the
political value of conscience. The Bill of Rights was conceived, of
course, as an inhibiting force against tyranny. It is interesting, with
regard to the potential political impact of selective conscientious ob44.
45.

(1970).
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jection, to recall that for American history, respect for individual conscience and for political dissent developed more or less together and
cannot, as a consequence, be as easily separated as the statute assumes.
The Reformation and the collapse of the divine right theory were
currents that developed from and influenced one another to a degree.
For English speaking peoples, Protestantism and the English Bible
granted a measure of individual independence in spiritual matters.
The citizen had direct access to God's words, and thus gained the
competence to recognize differences between what he understood the
scriptures to say and what religious authorities told them it said. Similarly, the concept of divine right became increasingly hard to defend. If
a king was not the conduit for God's will on earth, he was simply mortal,
although invested with office, and his words and acts were subject to
dispute. In each instance, absolute authority had to give under the
pressure of independent spiritual and political independence. The
king's wishes might be opposed on moral or on political grounds, or on
both. In either case, the absoluteness of the king's position, like the
prelate's, came to be susceptible to challenge.
For America, the result of these historically related mistrusts of king
and prelate is the institutionalized mistrust of power. The ruler is
answerable not only to his own wishes, but to law. The individual
consciences of his people, and their political judgments as well, act to
inhibit, rather than to facilitate, the exercise of power. The parallel
emergence of individual political and conscientious independence occured, I think, because they are in many ways identical. It is not only
that the difficulty of distinguishing them ought to reassure the Court,
but that their value to the state requires them to be indistinguishable.
In order to institutionalize the recognition that those who govern
are profoundly fallible, both morally and politically, the first amendment protects opposition, 46 no matter whether it springs from religious
or political conviction, in order to provide a check on the government's
will to do as it pleases. The selective conscience ought to be protected
for the sake of the individual. If there are enough similarly inclined
selective consciences to retard the state's pursuit of what it regards as
its interests, then the selective conscience should also be protected in
order to keep the government from doing what is unconscionable. That
recognizing selective conscientious objection would legitimize, and thus
46. The Court recognized this-to a degree at least-in the Pentagon Papers case,
United States v. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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impose, painful new doubts on the American body politic, cannot be
disputed. But those doubts would correspond more nearly to modem
philosophical currents and international law, and in addition, would
work to revitalize the endangered American ideal of limiting the power
of government.
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